Global language politics : Eurasia versus the Rest by Kamusella, Tomasz
Global Language Politics: Eurasia versus the 
Rest
Tomasz Kamusella
University of St Andrews 
Abstract
Globalization in the early 21st century can be considered as the age of in-
equality that splits the world into the rich North and the poor South. From 
the perspective of language politics, only very few discussed the division 
across the globe, especially, between Eurasia and the “Rest of the world.” In 
Eurasia, indigenous languages and scripts are used in official capacity, while 
the same function is fulfilled almost exclusively by non-indigenous (post/co-
lonial) European languages in the Rest of the world. In the countries where 
they are spoken, non-Eurasian languages have limited presence in the mass 
media, education, or in cyberspace. This linguistic imperialism par excellence 
is a long-lasting and pernicious legacy of European (western) colonialism. The 
aforementioned divide is strongly associated to the use of ethnolinguistic na-
tionalism in state building across many areas of Eurasia, while this ideology is 
not employed for this purpose outside the region.
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Introduction1
The fall of communism in Europe (1989), followed by the dissolution of 
the Warsaw Pact (1991), brought the disintegration of the Soviet Union 
(1991), and the end of the Cold War. Because of these events, the processes 
of the (western in its origin) globalization of economy literally spread across 
the entire world. The previous trimondial socio-economic and ideological 
* Tomasz Kamusella, School of History, University of St Andrews, St Katharine’s Lodge, 14 The Scores, 
St Andrews, Fife KY16 9BA, Scotland, UK; tdk2@st-andrews.ac.uk.
1 I thank Catherine Gibson and Jernej Kosi for their advice and suggestions. The article benefited from 
the two anonymous reviewers’ comments and suggestions for improvement. Obviously, it is me alone, 
who is responsible for any remaining infelicities.
 © 2020 Kamusella, published by Sciendo.  
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 4.0 License.
Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics
Volume 14 Issue 2  DOI 10.2478/jnmlp-2020-0008
118
Journal of Nationalism, Memory & Language Politics 14(2)
division of the globe – into the “First World” of the US-led western countries1 
with capitalist (free market) economies, the “Second World” of the Soviet 
camp of socialist (centrally-planned) economies, and the “Third World” of 
postcolonial economies (often identified with the India- and Yugoslavia-led 
Non-Aligned Movement) – was replaced by a single world of the neoliberal 
consensus. This consensus entailed democracy in politics and free market 
(capitalism) in economy (Fukuyama 1992). However, soon it was found that 
that such a kind of globalization did not generate prosperity, stability and 
equality for all before law or in economic terms. Now, after thirty years, it is 
clear that authoritarianism (totalitarianism) is widely preferred to democracy. 
The Beijing consensus of high-tech state control looms on the horizon. The 
adoption of capitalism (free market-ism) for organizing economy has been 
much more successful. However, it split the globe into the notional rich North 
(for instance, including Australia, Chile or South Africa, geographically 
located in the south) and the poor South (for example, including Armenia, 
Greenland or Pakistan, geographically located in the north).
But in this economy-centered diagnosis of the current state of the world, it 
is very surprising to note that only little attention has been paid to language, 
or rather language politics and its macro-patterns. The world public opinion 
can be bothered only with the question whether Chinese is going to replace 
English as a “global language” soon (cf Gil 2019). I believe, however, that 
a more significant issue at stake is which languages will function as official 
languages in the extant states, and which languages will be used for the 
media of state administration, education, and public discourse. At the height 
of the discussion devoted to the west’s continuing cultural imperialism (that 
is, dominance) in postcolonial (decolonized) states, the promising concept of 
“linguistic imperialism” was coined in 1992. But it has been predominantly 
brandished as a criticism of the postcommunist dogma of English being the 
sole global language (Phillipson 1992). Yet, the term linguistic imperialism 
appears to convey a much more profound insight and a wider range of 
meanings (cf Figueira 2013), which this article aspires to tease out. In the 
terms of official language use, the world can be split between Eurasia (that 
is, the single landmass of Asia, alongside its westernmost “promontory” of 
Europe) where indigenous languages tend to be overwhelmingly used in this 
1  I prefer not to capitalize the politicized term “the west” and the adjective derived from it (“western”), 
as I do not capitalize names of political doctrines (for instance, democracy, marxism) or ideologies (for 
example, liberalism, nazism). To a degree, “the west” is the preferred self-appellation of post/imperial 
Europe and these parts of the world where European colonizers and their descendants practically 
exterminated indigenous populations (that is, in North America or Australia). On the one hand, this 
term valorizes post/imperial Europe, while on the other, conceals the dark colonial pasts, including, 
industrialized slavery, ethnic cleansing, and genocide.
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function, and the Rest of the world where almost exclusively non-indigenous 
European (colonial, postcolonial) languages play this role. This situation 
largely extends to L2 (“foreign”) languages, formally acquired at school or on 
his/her own.
This deep cleavage, synonymous with linguistic imperialism, underpins global 
culture, and as such determines the dynamics of inherently unequal relations 
existing in all other spheres of human activities, whether it be economy, 
politics, or social relations. Human groups (nowadays known as “states” and 
“nations”) bond and interact through language only. However, language-in-
general (the English term, which takes no article or plural ending)—or the 
biological capacity for speech—comes in diverse varieties (actualizations of 
the aforementioned capacity), or languages (the English term that does take 
articles and the plural ending). Each such a variety, a language, is a message 
in its own right, produced, maintained, and molded by a group of people 
(that is, a speech community). Every language is a product of and also reflects 
the values and interests of its speech community, alongside power relations 
within the human group. Although it is often proposed, no language is a 
neutral channel for conveying information. There are no universal languages 
in this sense. What is universal in this context is the evolutionary (biologically 
generated) human capacity for speech (or the article-less language-with-
no-plural-ending). It is worth emphasizing that the primary (evolutionary) 
function of this capacity is to facilitate the bonding of humans into groups, 
not communication which at best is a secondary function of non-biological 
character, hence with no immediate evolutionary significance (Dunbar 1992; 
Dunbar 2010: 21-34).
European Model of Einzelsprache
The two radically different concepts are, unhelpfully, conveyed with the same 
English word “language.” In this article, I use the German specialist term 
Einzelsprache (pl Einzelsprachen) for denoting the aforementioned varieties, 
that is, actualizations of the evolutionary capacity for speech in order to 
disentangle the ensuing terminological confusion between these two look-
alike terms. In turn, this biological capacity is known as Sprache in German. 
Sprache is one of an array of biological (evolutionary) features that characterize 
humans as a species. Sprache (language, speech, and its physiology) is part 
and parcel of the hard-wiring (“hardware”) of the human body. On the other 
hand, Einzelsprachen are products of human groups, namely, products of their 
ingenuity, choices, and labor.
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Fig. 1. Terminological conundrum explicated
Actually, nowadays when one states that “X is a language (Einzelsprache),” 
an extensive set of necessary conditions is entailed, but left unspoken. It 
is assumed – wrongly – that all know what a language (Einzelsprache) is. 
Everyone raised and educated in the rich North (west), or who is literate 
in the poor South does know from everyday practices and common uses of 
literacy what an Einzelsprache is. But this knowledge is tacit. Stereotypically, 
the technology of writing is equated with each Einzelsprache, though this 
technology is neither part of Sprache (that is, the biological capacity for 
speech) nor of any Einzelsprache, just like a photograph of a person is not the 
person or any part of it (cf Saussure 1983: 25). Writing is a technology for the 
rudimentary graphic recording of human speech (Sprache), which comes in 
the form of this or that Einzelsprache.
However, the western understanding and practice of producing and 
maintaining Einzelsprachen is ingrained in the antique (Graeco-Roman, 
European) in its origin dichotomy of the oral and the written. Nowadays 
this dichotomy is mapped by the conceptual opposition between “dialect” 
and “language” (Einzelsprache). This foundational norm proposes that 
varieties of Sprache in oral use only are to be known as “dialects,” but those 
which are additionally recorded in writing should be seen as “languages.” 
An additional norm (“by-norm”) says that somehow closely related dialects 
have to be seen as “belonging to” a similarly related language. This by-norm 
tends to reflect the unequal relationship between a polity’s politically and/
or culturally dominant center (usually, the capital) and its provinces. The 
government and the inhabitants of the capital speak and write “a (written) 
language,” whereas uneducated provincials “mumble” in their (unwritten, 
oral) dialects, and so, now they need to become “civilized” by learning how 
to speak and write “properly” the capital’s language. Obviously, in order to 
achieve a level playing field, it could be said that a language is none other than 
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a “written dialect.” But it is never done, because such equalization of different 
statuses entailed by the conceptual dichotomy would effectively disempower 
the capital’s Einzelsprache. The role of this dichotomy of language and dialect 
is not to describe objectively a linguistic situation observed on the ground, 
but to establish, fortify, legitimize, and maintain the unequal relationship 
between speakers-cum-writers of the “civilized” Einzelsprache and speakers 
of “barbarian” (subaltern) dialects, which are deemed to be unsuitable for 
writing, or otherwise not worthy of such a distinction (cf Kamusella 2016; 
Van Roy 2019).
From Religion to Ethnolinguistic Nationalism
Until the late Middle Ages, Latin (alongside its specific Latin alphabet) was 
(almost) the sole language of power in western and central Europe.2 Latin 
was both the medium and message of this region’s sole legitimate ideology 
of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance, or the religion of 
Catholicism. The Catholic Church with its seat in Rome was the ultimate 
arbiter of the proper interpretation and uses of this ideology, as expounded 
in the Vulgate, or in the approved Latin translation of the Bible. Similarly, 
in eastern Europe and the Middle East, the Greek language (with its Greek 
alphabet) of the Gospels and the Septuagint (that is, the approved Greek 
translation of the Old Testament) played the same role in the Orthodox 
Church, headed by the Ecumenical Patriarch in Constantinople (Istanbul). 
Unlike the Catholic Pope, this Patriarch allowed a restricted number of 
approved Orthodox translations of the Greek Bible into other languages across 
the (Eastern) Roman Empire (“Byzantium”) and its sphere of influence. In 
this manner, the religiously-defined Einzelsprachen of Armenian, Georgian, 
(Church) Slavonic or Syriac – written in their specific scripts – were created. 
Finally, in the Islamic Caliphate, the Arabic language (alongside its Arabic 
script) of the Quran emerged. Meanwhile, within the confines of Judaism, the 
Hebrew language (together with its Hebrew letters) of the Torah (Pentateuch) 
continued to be cultivated.
The Judeo-Graeco-Romano-Islamic (or Middle Eastern) norm provided that a 
“true” Einzelsprache had to be the language and script of a “holy book,” which 
was the ideological source of this or that monotheistic (“Abrahamic”) religion. 
Ecclesiastical, temporal, and cesaropapist (ecclesiastical-cum-temporal) rulers 
wielded a given “holy tongue” as both symbol and medium of their legitimate 
2  I do not capitalize the names of cardinal points, or the adjective “central,” as long as they are em-
ployed for talking about subsections of a continent. Hence, “central Europe,” but “North America,” 
because the latter is the name of an entire continent. 
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power. The Pope and Caliph forbade the written use of other languages than 
the “holy one,” but as noted above, the Ecumenical Patriarch allowed for 
the limited development of Orthodox “holy by-languages.” Similarly, the 
doctrinal Sunni-Shia division in Islam, provided the way for the re-emergence 
of Persian (now written in Arabic letters) among many Shia communities.
In western and central Europe, during the 15th and 16th centuries, the 
Hussites, the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation breached this broad 
norm of one script and one holy tongue per a single monotheist faith. The 
process was facilitated and accelerated by the invention of printing. Temporal 
(secular) power was distanced from its ecclesiastical counterpart, and the 
unequal relationship between these two was reversed. Previously the latter 
had been considered superior to the former, and now temporal rulers largely 
subjected ecclesiasts to the needs and interests of the state and monarchy. The 
Pope was sidelined, and each polity’s power center (capital and/or royal court) 
was quick at enhancing its status with a new separate Einzelsprache, usually 
created through translating the Bible into it. All the new secular languages 
(Czech, French, German, or Portuguese) remained united with Latin because 
they were and still are written in the same Latin alphabet. Importantly, 
creators and users of these novel Einzelsprachen did not aspire to mold them 
into new holy tongues in their own right. This was one of the intellectual and 
political breakthroughs, which in the wake of the Thirty Years’ War (1618-
1648), resulted in the gradual separation of state and church across western 
and central Europe.
Orthodox polities led by Russia borrowed printing from western and central 
Europe, and emulated this model of the production of secular Einzelsprachen 
in the 18th and 19th centuries. Church Slavonic was replaced by the secular 
language of Russian in the late 18th and early 19th centuries. Thanks to this 
encouragement, Russian was followed by the construction of Bulgarian and 
Serbian as Orthodox Einzelsprachen in their own right during the last third of 
the 19th century. All the three secular languages retained Church Slavonic’s 
script, namely, Cyrillic. The Orthodox Romanians, who were placed in the 
cleavage between Catholic-Protestant and Orthodox Europe, developed 
their Cyrillic-based semi-holy tongue of Romanian for their Orthodox 
Church already in the 16th century. Three centuries later, in the mid-1860s, 
Romanian literati completed this process of westernization (‘modernization’) 
by switching from “backward” Cyrillic to the “progressive” Latin alphabet for 
writing and printing in Romanian. Cases of replacing the holy tongue’s script 
with another for writing and printing in a secular Einzelsprache were few. 
Typically, the role of such switches was to crush religious-cum-traditionalist 
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opposition to westernization and to accelerate secularization. That was the 
case of the 1928 replacement of the Arabic script with the Latin alphabet for 
Turkish in the newly founded post-Ottoman Republic of Turkey.
It was the “holy book” that defined and codified (standardized) the holy 
tongue. The ideological importance of a religion enforced the norms of use 
(spelling, pronunciation, syntax, or word formation) of such a language. 
Grammars and dictionaries of a holy tongue functioned as supplementary 
textbooks and aide-mémoires for getting the basics right, whereas the very 
text of the holy book was seen as “god’s3 words,” which remained the ultimate 
reference for deciding on correctness of usages. Creators and codifiers of 
secular Einzelsprachen did not have any holy books of this type to fall back 
on. Initially, the logic of profit dictated employing such words and usages in 
translations of the Bible that would be readily comprehensible to the largest 
number of potential readers. Subsequent generations of literati who gained 
the skill of writing and reading from such translations acquired the tendency 
to avoid local (“dialectal”) usages in writing by default. This “principle” 
and other customs of the “appropriate” manner of writing and reading an 
Einzelsprache were recorded and systemized in grammars of such a secular 
language. Its vocabulary was standardized, systematized, and broadened 
in bilingual dictionaries, which initially paired it with the holy tongue’s 
lexicon, and then also with other important Einzelsprachen. The importance 
of an Einzelsprache was and still is decided and dictated by the economic, 
political, and military might of the polity, which claims and espouses such an 
Einzelsprache as its own.
The initial stage of standardization was reached with the production of a 
multivolume authoritative monolingual dictionary in which the Einzelsprache’s 
vocabulary was defined and explicated in the very same language. Such a 
monolingual dictionary was typically commissioned, compiled, and provided 
the seal of approval by a given polity’s Academy of Sciences. Often, an 
“academy dictionary” of this kind came in tandem with an “academy 
grammar” (cf Considine 2017). Both became the basis for correct usage that 
is spread through school textbooks, and checked upon and reinforced by all 
kinds of entrance examinations to universities and civil service positions. Based 
on these foundations, other references were compiled and thus confirmed the 
“modernity” (that is, western character, or the recognized compliance with 
the western concept and model of “a language”) of an Einzelsprache. It should 
3  As in the case of the names of ideologies that I do not capitalize, likewise, I prefer not to capitalize 
the name of the sole divinity in the indigenous monotheistic (Abrahamic) religions of the Middle 
East and Europe. However, not to flout the accepted orthographic conventions too much, I capitalize 
names of the mentioned religions.
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be noted that follow-up reference works of this type included a multivolume 
encyclopedia of “all knowledge,” a spelling (orthographic) dictionary for 
masses only with rudimentary elementary education, or a pronunciation 
dictionary for theater actors and radio speakers. The rise of the ubiquitous 
press and cheap books gradually bridged the chasm between the hardly 
literate poor and the rich literati. Then scholarly-cum-political projects of 
etymological and historical dictionaries of the Einzelsprache in question were 
considered. The former joined the Einzelsprache’s speech community with 
“civilizationally, culturally and racially respectable” speech communities 
of other, especially “important,” languages. On the other hand, framers of 
historical dictionaries usually laid claim to a chunk of space and time (that 
is, written and printed material from such an area and period), which they 
saw as suitable for the perceived “greatness” of their Einzelsprache and state 
(kingdom, empire, republic).
The isomorphic (overlapping) and homogenizing in its character normative 
model of one faith, one holy tongue and its equally “holy” script was gradually 
fitted to the needs of secular politics. In the epoch of “enlightened absolutism” 
(from the mid-18th to mid-19th centuries), a holy tongue and/or multitude of 
secular languages used for administration across a single polity’s regions were 
reduced and replaced ideally with only one indigenous Einzelsprache, written 
in a single script. This normative compulsion, for instance, underpinned the 
1784 decision to replace Latin (and some other languages) with German 
across the Habsburg lands (known as the Austrian Empire since 1804) 
(Judson 2016: 80).
Meanwhile, the French Revolution brought nationalism to European politics 
as the leading ideology of statehood creation, legitimation, and maintenance. 
This ideology proposes that the nation4 is the highest “taxonomic” kind of 
human group possible and that only nations have the right to their own 
statehood. Nationalists believe that humanity is “naturally” divided into 
nations; hence, the initial task was to replace the non-national political map 
of Europe with nation-states, or states for one nation only. In France, this 
goal was achieved by declaring that all the country’s inhabitants are equal 
citizens. Furthermore, by the virtue of this declaration, the French citizens are 
construed together as the French nation. Hence, in this arrangement, the state 
equates the nation (cf Weber 1976).
4  Proponents of the ideology of nationalism often overlook the fact that this ideology, alongside the 
very term “nation,” are artifacts of human creativity and imagination. Thus, for instance, for over two 
millennia, the Latin in its origin word “nation” has been deployed for denoting different things during 
different periods of time in different regions of Europe and the Middle East (cf Kemiläinen 1964).
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Because of a variety of reasons, such a polity-centered pattern of nation- and 
state-building (or civic nationalism) was rejected in central Europe. During 
the course of the wars against Napoleonic France, a new understanding of 
the nation was proposed at the turn of the 1810s, namely that all speakers of 
a given language should constitute a nation. Speech community was equated 
with the nation in this manner, which is the basic defining feature of ethnic 
(ethnolinguistic) nationalism. Whereas a stateless civic nation is considered 
an impossibility, the majority of ethnic nations usually start as stateless 
national movements (Hroch 1985). As a result, the period between the 1848 
revolutions and the end of the Great War was marked in central Europe by 
the emergence of ethnolinguistic nation-states that eventually replaced the 
region’s non-national empires.
Colonization
As mentioned above, the early modern period in western and central Europe 
was marked by the creation of secular Einzelsprachen. The rise of science, 
unshackled from the ideological limitations imposed by religious taboos 
(dogmas), contributed to relative political stability and economic prosperity, 
which followed after the end of religious wars. As a result, the steep growth in 
population and economic resources was utilized for the sake of colonization, 
which meant overseas territorial expansion in the case of western Europe’s 
polities (also known, as “great powers”). The traditional thinking on 
European colonial empires defined colonization simplistically as the process 
of establishing settlements (colonies; from Lat. colōnia ‘settlement’). But, in 
the definition, no attention is paid to the ethnic dimension of this process. 
Europeans (for instance, Dutchmen, Englishmen, Frenchmen, Scots, 
Spaniards, or Portuguese) sailed to a non-European territory, and claimed 
it for their home country. In other words, they stole (“annexed, seized”) 
by trick or force a tract of land of the local non-European indigenous 
inhabitants, with the intention of founding a European settlement (usually, a 
military or militarized outpost) in the midst of a non-European population, 
obviously without getting their consent. If non-Europeans disagreed with 
such an imposition, they were typically massacred and enslaved with the 
use of “superior” weaponry or treachery. Furthermore, European diseases 
inadvertently brought along by European conquerors and land thieves 
often decimated non-European populations, especially in the Americas and 
Australasia (Crosby 1986).
In Europe, agriculture remained the dominant sector of economy until the 
mid-19th century. Land was the main measure and generator of wealth. 
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Unsurprisingly, colonizers went overseas mainly in search of arable land. How 
did they justify their theft of land from indigenous non-European owners 
and ethnic groups? At that time, despite gradual secularization, the Bible 
remained the foundation of European law and morality. Moreover, the Bible 
is an intellectual product of Middle Eastern agriculturalists and their societies. 
According to their perspective, it is unjustifiable to allow land “lie fallow.” 
Such a land, by definition, is considered as “ownerless” from the biblical 
perspective. Hence, whenever an agriculturalist stumbles across “fallow 
land,” he can legally “take it into possession.” It does not matter that hunter-
gatherers or pastoralists may use and take care of this land, together with 
its fauna and flora, to ensure livelihood for their families and communities. 
According to the biblical-cum-European legal perspective as long as land is 
not cultivated in accordance with a form of agriculture recognized in Europe, 
people living in such a land are seen as unable to own it. As a result, colonizers 
could “legally” steal lands of this type, and chase away, enslave, or exterminate 
its original non-European and non-agriculturalist owners (Churchill 1993; 
Harring 1998).
Colonization is none other than naked land grabbing, violent and unjustified 
looting from the perspective of the original non-European owners. However, 
at times, in the “New World,” conquistadors came across ethnic groups who 
practiced agriculture and lived in formally organized states. Posed with this 
dilemma, the colonizers justified their looting by stating that non-European 
populations knew nothing about the “good news” of Christ. This means that 
their ownership of land was invalid till they became Christians. The colonizers 
also emphasized that the non-European “heathens” could hear about Christ 
due to the former’s “good will.” This message was deemed more indispensable 
and precious than anything else in this world. Hence, it appeared justifiable 
that the colonizers should be rewarded with the land of the converted heathens 
(or “New Christians”) (cf Foreman 1932) because of this unique service (of 
cultural destruction).
The colonial land grabs and the subjugation of non-European ethnic groups 
was accompanied by the imposition of the European cultural and socio-
economic package. At first, the process entailed the destruction of indigenous 
culture, making indigenous ethnic groups into “people without history” 
(Wolf 1982). This package’s socio-economic element was gradually translated 
into agriculture and capitalism, while its cultural constituent stemmed from 
the Bible as the source of legislation and morality. But, in terms of language 
policy, it was a case of the wholesale transplant of the holy tongue of Latin 
from Europe to a colony, alongside a given Einzelsprache of colonizers, typically 
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written in the Latin alphabet. Latin was employed for spreading Christianity 
and justifying the forcing of this religion on colonial populations. Further, 
the European Einzelsprache became the colonial language of administration 
and of the system of socio-economic oppression imposed on non-European 
populations.
Until non-European communities acquired a working knowledge of European 
Einzelsprachen, the Bible and accompanying religious material were translated 
into “indigenous languages.” De facto, it was missionaries-colonizers who 
imposed the concept of Einzelsprache and its preferred uses on the non-
European linguistic practices, without giving any respect to the actual needs 
and aspirations of non-European ethnic groups. According to missionaries-
colonizers’ perspective, non-Europeans were “children” and could not know 
any better, so what they “really” needed was Christ and the Gospel. These 
self-appointed European colonial specialists of socio-cultural engineering 
did not give any importance to indigenous elite speech varieties, denigrating 
them as “heathenish.” Instead, they usually chose the speech variety of a given 
mission and its vicinity, that is, where the local population and their customs 
had already been thoroughly subjugated and neutered. On this tabula rasa, 
missionaries-colonizers built a missionary Einzelsprache. Its phonemes and 
basic vocabulary were non-European, but its form and message (conveyed 
through this missionary language) were fully European and Christian (Stoll 
1982).
From Decolonization to Linguistic Imperialism
In the traditional approach to this issue, it is proposed that decolonization 
commenced with European colonies in the Americas that successfully declared 
and fought for independence against European metropolises (Thurner 2019). 
After World War II, the maritime colonial empires of western European 
powers became economically and morally unviable. Most of the colonies in 
Africa, Asia, and Oceania were granted independence in the 1960s, which 
thus became known as the high age of decolonization (Thomas, Moore and 
Butler 2010). At present, decolonization is generally associated only with this 
postwar wave of colonies that became independent nation-states in the wake 
of the break-ups of the European maritime empires.
What is then “decolonization”? Simply speaking, this should be a process in the 
course of which the salient effects of colonization are swiftly and permanently 
reversed. But, in the political sense, it ought to mean the reinstatement of 
precolonial or similar indigenous forms of statehood or group organization. 
Not such a thing was ever attempted outside Eurasia. In most cases, colonies 
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in the Americas, Africa, and Oceania were simply transformed into nation-
states with the same borders and populations as those of the former colonies. 
In Eurasia, independent India in part was constituted on the tradition of 
the Mughal Empire, which had been gradually subdued between the mid-
18th and mid-19th centuries by British colonizers. And even more explicitly, 
the decolonized countries of southeast Asia (Burma, Cambodia, Laos, and 
Vietnam) claimed historical and political continuity with their respective pre-
colonial monarchies. Yet, even these Eurasian postcolonial polities chose to 
define themselves as nation-states, in accordance with the (western) European 
model of (modern) statehood. In the contemporary world, this is the sole 
legitimate model of statehood that is now universally accepted, especially after 
the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991. The Soviet Union was the world’s 
only extensive polity, which did not define itself as a nation-state after 1945. It 
was seen to be a communist state, or a polity fully defined and legitimized by 
the non-national ideology of communism.5
From the socio-economic perspective, decolonization should be about the 
returning of stolen land to indigenous inhabitants or their descendants. 
This program was implemented in these postcolonial nation-states where 
indigenous ethnic groups survived the colonial period and constitute the 
majority till date, or at least a sizeable plurality of the population; namely, in 
Eurasia and Africa, and on some island states of Oceania in the south Pacific. 
On the other hand, indigenous ethnic groups of the Americas, Australia, 
and New Zealand were either exterminated or thoroughly marginalized. 
Hence, land remains in hands of colonizers and their descendants in the 
postcolonial countries established across these areas. In addition, millions of 
slaves were captured in Africa between the 16th and 19th centuries and they 
were transported to the Americas. And during the last two centuries, millions 
of immigrants – first, from Europe, and then from across Eurasia – have 
arrived to the colonies or postcolonial states. Such polities in the unrepentant 
colonial-like vocabulary are known as “settler countries” (cf Cavanagh and 
Veracini 2017), while critics refer to the continents with countries of this type 
as “Neo-Europes” (Crosby 1986: 11). The neologism indicates that original 
indigenous ethnic groups were replaced in ethnic, cultural, economic, and 
biological (genetic) sense by Europeans, or more broadly, Eurasians.
From the cultural sense perspective, decolonization ought to be about the 
reintroduction of precolonial or similar practices in the sphere of group beliefs 
5  Obviously, the “known unknown” of the European Union may complicate this picture in the future, 
should the majority of its member states agree that this de jure “international organization” is a polity. 
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(“religion, morality”), social cohesion (“art, culture, folklore”), and language 
politics (“Einzelsprache”). However, this kind of reversal was (to a degree) 
possible only in these postcolonial countries where indigenous ethnic groups 
constitute the majority of the population and managed to preserve such 
precolonial cultural practices. Hence, the reversal of this kind turned out to 
be unworkable in the Neo-Europes of the Americas and Australia. So totally, 
a cultural reversal of colonization took place only in Eurasia’s postcolonial 
nation-states, especially in southeast Asia.6 In Africa, indigenous ethnic groups 
constitute the majority of the population, but in most cases the local religions 
were replaced either with Christianity, or in some cases with Islam (cf Achebe 
1958). By maintaining stable and regular worldwide sailing and train routes, 
European colonialism – rather inadvertently – facilitated the spread of Islam 
across Eurasia and Africa.
Finally, the replacement of colonial European languages in the postcolonial 
nation-states located in the Neo-Europes proved an impossibility. Until 
now, American or Australian languages are marginalized, neglected, and 
disparagingly labeled as “native.” It is indigenous Americans or Australians 
who are expected and pressurized by school and state administration to acquire 
a given colonial European language, not the other way around.7 In Africa, 
where there are few European settlers, upgrading a missionary indigenous 
Einzelsprache to the status of a national or official language was a viable 
option. However, colonial European Einzelsprachen were retained as official 
or state languages in the interest of maintaining a proverbial level playing 
field for typically highly multiethnic and polyglot populations observed in the 
postcolonial nation-states. The trend became “normalized” to a high degree, 
so that it was followed even in such ethnolinguistically homogenous polities 
as Burundi, Madagascar, or Rwanda. This very sociolinguistic reality on the 
ground defines what I see as “linguistic imperialism.” European colonial 
empires and colonial administrations left half a century or longer. But the 
legacy of colonial European languages remains largely unchallenged even in 
6  Of course, it was not a reversal to how things had been in the precolonial times. The meaning in-
tended here is mainly limited to returning to the use of indigenous languages in official contexts, from 
which colonial languages were phased out.
7  Graduate students in the United States have a language requirement as part of their PhD programs. 
Sadly, almost no American history PhD students choose to take an elective in “Native American 
languages,” even though this would be an obvious enrichment for many research topics. (I thank 
Catherine Gibson for this remark.)
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these postcolonial countries where it would be relatively easy and politically 
unproblematic to replace them with indigenous Einzelsprachen.8
Indigenous languages, reshaped (that is, “modernized, westernized”) in 
emulation of colonial European languages, were (re-)introduced as national 
and official ones only in some Eurasian postcolonial nation-states. It appears 
that this process turned out to be swifter where an indigenous script survived 
(or was freshly developed) for writing and printing in a non-European 
Einzelsprache, and such examples are Bangla (Bengali) in Bangladesh, 
Burmese in Burma, Hindi in India, Khmer in Cambodia, or Lao in Laos. 
But, in southeast Asia the national languages of Filipino in the Philippines, 
Indonesian in Indonesia, Malaysian in Malaysia, and Vietnamese in Vietnam 
are written and printed in the European alphabet of Latin letters. In the last 
case of Vietnam, it appears to be an attempt to stem the continuous (and 
still) strong influence of Chinese culture, script, and language in this country. 
Moreover, in Indonesia and Malaysia, and partly also in the Philippines, the 
preference for the Latin alphabet may be due to the 19th-century western 
belief that the Arabic script was not suitable for “modern” languages. This 
pernicious stereotype persisted until the mid-20th century (Burrows 2016: 32).
The more prevalent or weaker presence and the de facto or coofficial use of 
former colonial European languages in south and southeast Asian nation-
states appears to be related to the dominant form of nationalism employed 
for statehood construction, legitimation, and maintenance. For instance, 
India is a highly polyglot, multiethnic, and polyconfessional nation-state, 
with a population twice the size of Europe’s. Hence, only civic nationalism 
offering equal Indian citizenship to everyone ensures the same common 
denominator to all that binds the highly diverse population into the Indian 
nation and makes the Indian nation-state possible. As a result, although the 
Indian Constitution designates Hindi as the country’s national language,9 
de facto it is the European Einzelsprache of English that fulfills this role10 
8  However, there are precious few postcolonial countries that are as ethnolinguistically homogenous 
as Burundi, Madagascar or Rwanda. In the vast majority of colonies, European powers followed the 
logic of divide et impera (“divide and rule”). Different precolonial polities and ethnic groups were put 
together (often against their will) in a colony or split into fragments among different colonies, so that 
not a single indigenous group or pre-colonial elite could challenge European colonizers. As a result, 
the latter became the ultimate arbiters and controllers among various conflicted indigenous ethnic 
groups and former elites in a colony. This technology of imperial rule prevented and still prevents the 
emergence of a consensual indigenous official language in the majority of postcolonial nation-states, 
which ethnically and territorially are continuations of former colonies.
9  According to the Indian Constitution, Hindi is the sole official language of the entire country (Ar-
ticle 343 1949).
10  Apart from Hindi and English, 21 other India’s languages are employed in official capacity at the 
regional (provincial) level of India’s states (Constitutional 2020).
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(Benedikter 2009: 32-35). The aforementioned nation-states of southeast Asia 
are located at the other end of the continuum of nationalism. All of them 
(including Thailand, which was never colonized, with Thai as its official and 
national language) opted for ethnolinguistic nationalism, including even such 
a multilingual polity as Burma.11
Pakistan is an interesting in-between case. Its main ideological foundation 
is based on ethnoreligious nationalism, which is clearly announced by the 
formal designation of this country as an “Islamic republic.” Urdu is Pakistan’s 
national language, while English fulfills the role of the preferred official 
language, just like in neighboring India (Constitution 2012: Art. 251). 
However, less than eight percent of Pakistan’s population speaks Urdu as their 
first language (“mother tongue”) (Government 2014), while three quarters 
of all Urdu-speakers live in India (Breton 1999: 183; Gunnemark 1992: 90). 
So Urdu is a “foreign” (L2) language in Pakistan from this perspective, yet 
it is indigenous to the Indian subcontinent (Rahman 2011). The situation 
in Indonesia is also similar, where less than a fifth of the inhabitants speak 
the country’s national and official language of Indonesian as their first 
language (Penduduk 2012: 421, 427). However, Indonesian is indigenous to 
the country, and no European language plays any official role in Indonesia, 
unlike in Pakistan.
Red (but Not So Thin) Line of the Global Cleavage
Nowadays, the entire world’s habitable territory (that is, less Antarctica) is 
divided among the extant nation-states. However, polities organized in line 
with the logic and assumptions of ethnolinguistic nationalism are limited to 
Eurasia, while civic nationalism is the prevalent ideology of statehood creation, 
legitimation and maintenance in the Rest of the world. In terms of language 
politics, indigenous Einzelsprachen are employed as official (state, national, 
administrative, or working) languages in Eurasia’s polities, though in some 
countries post/colonial12 European languages may be used for “back-up” or 
11  Obviously, this generalization does not cover the special cases of such mini-polities as Brunei or 
Singapore.
12  I use the somewhat neologism-like form of the term “postcolonial,” namely, “post/colonial,” in order 
to signal the, at present, confusing and quite confused ideological status of European Einzelsprachen 
in use outside Europe. When European colonial empires still thrived, there was no doubt that these 
were straightforwardly “colonial languages.” Now when the empires already disappeared, most prefer 
to refer to these European Einzelsprachen as “postcolonial languages” by direct analogy to the label 
“postcolonial state,” typically applied to former colonies-turned-independent nation-states. However, 
the very fact of sticking to former colonial European languages in postcolonial states indicates that 
political independence does not equate cultural-cum-social independence. This ambivalence is char-
acteristic of linguistic imperialism, that is, the continuing employment of former colonial European 
languages in postcolonial nation-states.
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“acknowledged non-national” roles. On the other hand, almost in all cases 
outside Eurasia non-indigenous Einzelsprachen function as official languages 
in the extant nation-states. Among the vast majority, these languages are just 
a handful of post/colonial European Einzelsprachen. Symptomatically, not a 
single “Rest” (non-Eurasian) Einzelsprache is employed in the function of an 
official (state) language in a Eurasian polity.
Area State (official) 
languages
Type of  
nationalism
Population







civic 2.5 billion (32%)
Fig. 2. Main features of the cleavage between Eurasia and the Rest of the world 
in official (state) language use
It is interesting to observe and analyze the location and dynamics of this rarely 
noticed or discussed line that separates Eurasia’s countries where indigenous 
Einzelsprachen are employed as official languages from those across the Rest 
of the world in which non-indigenous (mostly European) Einzelsprachen 
fulfill this role. In the southeastern “maritime corner” of Eurasia, Papua 
New Guinea constitutes a significant cornerstone of this cleavage. The 
country shares borders with Indonesia where its indigenous Einzelsprache of 
Indonesian is used officially, and with Australia where English functions as the 
country’s de facto national and official language. Papua New Guinea’s official 
languages are English, Tok Pisin, and Hiri Motu. English is the country’s 
former colonial language, while the two others are creoles, or “mixed” 
Einzelsprachen, that in their makeup draw both on English and indigenous 
Austronesian languages (Constitution 1975: Art. 2.11). The situation in Papua 
New Guinea is symbolic of official language use across today’s Oceania. 
It is characterized by a certain use of indigenous languages, de facto or de 
jure deemed as national, while the dominant role is invariably bestowed on 
European Einzelsprachen. New Zealand, placed at the other (southernmost) 
end of Oceania and bordering Australia follows a similar pattern. English is 
the dominant language, while co-official status has been guaranteed to the 
indigenous Austronesian Einzelsprache of Maori since 1987 (Māori 1987: Art. 
3). Yet, only a tiny group of 1 to 3 percent of the population speak and write 
this language regularly with a degree of fluency (Ngā puna 2015), while in 
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Papua New Guinea practically all speak an indigenous language apart from 
the nation’s state official languages.
Further, when the Federated States of Micronesia, Nauru, the Solomon 
Islands and Tuvalu are considered, English is the de facto official language, 
although indigenous languages exist in these polities. The same situation 
prevails in the US territories of Guam and American Samoa; and in New 
Zealand’s dependencies of the Cook Islands, Niue and Tokelau. Similarly, in 
New Caledonia, French Polynesia, or Wallis and Futuna, which are overseas 
territories of France, indigenous languages are spoken, but French only is 
official. Hence, the situation is like in the Rest of the world.
Elsewhere across Oceania, the Eurasian model of language politics is observed. 
In Kiribati, the Einzelsprache of Kiribati is the country’s national and official 
language, while in the Marshall Islands – Marshallese, in the Northern 
Mariana Islands – Carolinian and Chamorro, in Palau – Palauan, in Samoa – 
Samoan, or in Tonga – Tongan. Yet, in all these island nation-states, though 
English is designated as an official language, it dominates de facto in public 
use (Constitution 1979: Art 13.1; Constitution 1994: 22.3; Constitution 
1995: Art 127; Constitution 1997: Art. 54; Marshall 1995: Art. 16.5). Vanuatu 
constitutes a special case, in which both English and French function as the 
country’s official and dominant languages in public life and education apart 
from the national language of Bislama (Vanuatu’s Constitution 2013: Art. 3). 
Colonialism rubbed off on today’s Fiji in another way. Apart from the national 
language of Fijian and official English, the status of a third official language 
was granted to the Indian (Eurasian) Einzelsprache of Hindi (Constitution 
2013: Art. 3.3). Hindi is spoken by descendants of indentured laborers 
brought from British India to Fiji, when this island was a British colony. In 
the aforementioned cases, the pattern of official language use is similar to 
that in some south Asian countries, where an indigenous Einzelsprache is 
recognized as national and official language, although a European language is 
predominantly employed for administration and education.
Looking westward, the analyzed line of cleavage between states with 
indigenous or non-indigenous Einzelsprachen in official use cuts across the 
Middle East and north Africa. This line is not so visible in this area in the first 
glance. Obviously, the broad belt of territory from Mesopotamia (or today’s 
Iraq) and the Arabian Peninsula in the east to Morocco, Western Sahara and 
Mauritania in the west is dominated by the Islamic countries with Arabic 
as their national and official language. But is Arabic – namely, the standard 
form of this language – indigenous to this vast area? In the seventh century, 
this Einzelsprache was created (codified) as the holy tongue of the Quran in 
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the Arabian Peninsula. So, Arabic is indigenous only to this Peninsula based 
on this perspective. For other aforementioned areas, it was brought in by the 
invading armies of the rapidly expanding Islamic Caliphate during the seventh 
and early eighth centuries. In this manner, Maghreb and Mesopotamia 
were overhauled into “Neo-Arabias,” to the exclusion from written use and 
the subsequent suppression of Aramaic (Syriac) in Mesopotamia, Coptic in 
Egypt and Berber across Maghreb. In the same manner, the Arabo-Muslim 
conquistadors did away with the holy tongues-cum-lingua francas of Persian, 
Greek, and Latin (cf. Slugget and Currie 2014: 14-19).
The adoption of Arabic in this extensive swath of land conquered by the 
Arabo-Muslim conquistadors was facilitated by the fact that Aramaic, Berber 
and Coptic, as Semitic (Afro-Asiatic) languages, were closely interrelated – 
in structure, vocabulary, and pronunciation – with the Semitic Einzelsprache 
of Arabic. That is, Arabic was not so radically different like Spanish or 
English vis-à-vis America’s indigenous languages, be it Nahuatl in Mexico or 
Massachusett in Massachusetts. The non-indigenous character of Arabic in 
Maghreb, Egypt, or Mesopotamia is observed from the language’s very name 
that means “the Einzelsprache of the Arabian Peninsula.” It is not an Egyptian, 
Maghrebian, or Mesopotomian language. But is standard Arabic indigenous 
to Arabic-speakers (that is, Bahrainis, Emiratis, Kuwaitis, Omanis, Qataris, 
Saudi Arabs, or Yemenis) in today’s Arabian Peninsula? Should the indigeneity 
of an Einzelsprache be defined in the terms of it being the first language (L1) of 
a speech community, then standard Arabic is not indigenous to the peninsula, 
either. It is so, because no stable and self-reproducing speech community 
speaks standard Arabic as their first (“native”) language. Arabic-speakers 
from Maghreb to Arabia and Mesopotamia speak in local Arabic dialects 
which are their first languages. These “dialects” are as different from Arabic 
as French or Italian to Latin. The standard Arabic of the Quran is removed 
14 centuries from today’s speech (dialects) in the Arabic-speaking countries, 
and as such one acquires it only in school for the purpose of writing and 
some limited formal oral uses. The situation is similar to medieval and early 
modern Europe, where Latin was the main Einzelsprache of administration 
and education, though its speech community had disappeared in the second 
half of the first millennium CE (Kamusella 2017).
Another interesting and in some ways similar is the case of the language 
Ivrit (Modern Hebrew), that is, the national and official language of Israel. 
Ivrit is purported to be a direct continuation of ancient (biblical) Hebrew. 
However, this Hebrew in question disappeared as a language of everyday life 
in the second century CE, typically replaced by the then high status language 
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of Aramaic. Between that time and the early 20th century, or for almost 
two millennia, there was no L1 speech community of Hebrew. Yet, ancient 
Hebrew continued to function like “postvernacular” Latin or Arabic, used as a 
specialized Einzelsprache of religion, scholarship, and written communication, 
and continually passed from older males to boys in religious schools (yeshivas). 
During the last third of the 19th century in central Europe, this antiquated 
Hebrew was “modernized” and made into a western-style Einzelsprache on the 
model of Yiddish, Spanyol, German, Polish or Russian. In many ways, Ivrit 
can be seen as a grammatically Slavic, or Slavic-Germanic language with a 
Semitic lexicon (Wexler 1990). Hence, in essence, it is a European language 
transplanted to the Middle East in the course of the creation of Israel during 
the first half of the 20th century. But when considering the non-vernacular 
standard Arabic, Ivrit is now a vernacular Einzelsprache, with its recently 
created (or indigenized) speech community.
Paradoxically, the sole vernacular Arabic Einzelsprache is Maltese, or the 
national and official language of the Mediterranean island nation-state of 
Malta (Kaye 1997). It is a Maghrebian (Libyan-Tunisian) dialect of Arabic 
(Semitic) used both in speech and writing. Hence, the Maltese constitute 
the sole “dialectal Arabic” speech community whose language of everyday 
communication functions as a recognized Einzelsprache. Due to the vagaries 
of history and because the Maltese profess Catholicism, the Einzelsprache of 
Maltese is imbued with a lot of English and Italian vocabulary. Just like India, 
Malta is a former British colony, so English is employed in this country as 
its co-official language. Such colonial legacies in language policy can be also 
observed across all the Arabic-speaking countries. Due to the disjunction 
between the vernaculars and the standard Einzelsprache of Arabic, the post/
colonial European Einzelsprachen of English, French, Italian or Spanish 
continue to function in these countries as a preferred language of written 
communication and reading material depending on the region.
Special Cases across the “Rest:” Rooting for Indigenous Languages
South of the Arabophone Islamic belt of north Africa and the Middle East, or 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the post/colonial European Einzelsprache of English, 
French, Spanish, and Portuguese (with some walk-on roles also reserved for 
Arabic and German) function as sole or leading official languages. In some 
cases indigenous African Einzelsprachen are accorded the role of national 
languages, and they are employed as media of education sometimes. Yet, they 
are never used at the level of university. Invariably, it is a post/colonial (non-
indigenous) European Einzelsprache that fulfills this role.
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Some suggest that South Africa’s co-official language of Afrikaans is an 
indigenous African language. It is a form of Dutch preserved and developed 
in line with the local conditions and needs, by the descendants of the original 
17th- and 18th-century Dutch colonizers in South Africa. During this 
process, Afrikaans became imbued with a lot of Khoisan, Bantu, and Malay 
(Indonesian) vocabulary, but to a large extent remains mutually intelligible 
with Dutch. Hence, Afrikaans can be considered as a European Einzelsprache, 
though not colonial in the traditional sense. Yet, the discriminatory policy 
of apartheid (“separateness”) pursued in South Africa during the second 
half of the 20th century ideologically connected this Einzelsprache to 
the ethnolinguistically and racially defined nation of “white” Afrikaners. 
Although they are a numerical minority, the Afrikaners dominated the 
country’s politics, economy, and social life till 1994, when democracy and 
equality for all were granted. Apartheid – defined as the policy of racially 
and ethnolinguistically “separate development” – did make Afrikaans into 
a de facto colonial European (“white”) language at par with English. In 
1925, Afrikaans replaced Dutch and was officially recognized as a co-official 
language – alongside English – in Britain’s colony of South Africa (Willemyns 
2013: 222).
Interestingly, the apartheid government of South Africa chose to justify this 
system of inequality with the central European ideology of ethnolinguistic 
nationalism. After the Great War, the Entente under US President Woodrow 
Wilson’s leadership, employed this ideology of statehood creation and 
legitimation for transforming central Europe’s multiethnic empires into 
(ideally) ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-states. This process of 
implementation was called as “national self-determination,” which was 
viewed positively and is still considered one of the most important principles 
of international law. Hence, architects of apartheid seized upon this unique 
PR opportunity to counter any accusations of racism, by stating that they 
would create ethnolinguistically defined nation-states for South Africa’s 
indigenous (“black”) ethnic groups in accordance with this principle. And 
they did, beginning in the 1960s. However, only 14 percent of the country’s 
territory was set aside for the “black homelands,” which critics disparaged 
as “bantustans,” or “black ghetto-like states.” Most of the South Africa’s 
population was expected to squeeze into this small corner of the country, and 
the rest of the land would be used exclusively by white and “colored” South 
Africans. Indigenous Bantu languages – such as Tswana, Xhosa or Zulu – 
were employed in the administration and education across these unilaterally 
created ethnolinguistic nation-states resulting in their rapid standardization 
toward western-style Einzelsprachen. However, the legally enforced condition 
137
Kamusella 
Global Language Politics: Eurasia versus the Rest
that Tswana-, Xhosa- or Zulu-speakers living and working in Cape Town or 
Johannesburg must “go back” to their “homeland” (nation-state) to continue 
the education through the medium of their “native language,” rather than 
preferred English, was seen by the concerned persons as highly discriminatory.
Obviously, schools and universities teaching in the media of indigenous 
(“black”) languages had lower budgets and worse facilities than the “white” 
counterparts outside the bantustans with English and Afrikaans as languages 
of instruction. Unsurprisingly, the majority of the Tswanas, Xhosas, or Zulus 
considered this imposition of compulsory education in their L1 languages 
(“mother tongues”) as yet another form of apartheid discrimination. They 
wanted to become full and equal citizens of all of South Africa, and to this 
end preferred education in English for their children. Apartheid officials 
feigned being astounded by this negative reaction and pointed to the example 
of central Europe where ethnolinguistic national movements for long decades 
had clamored for education in their “national” (indigenous, L1) languages 
and for ethnolinguistically defined independent nation-states. However, they 
overlooked the fact that it was the concerned ethnic groups13 who demanded 
political solutions of this type in central Europe, while in South Africa 
these institutional and political solutions were imposed by the dominating 
whites on the “black nations.” The system of “black homelands” with “black 
(native)” languages, was extended to South Africa’s mandate of South West 
Africa (Namibia). Actually, four such “black” nation-states were granted full 
independence in South Africa, namely Bophutatswana for the Tswanas, Ciskei 
and Transkei for the Xhosas, and Venda for the Vendas. The independence of 
Namibia (1990) and the final dismantling of apartheid (1994) brought an 
end to this system of autonomous and independent “black” ethnolinguistic 
nation-states (Kaura 1995). Yet, its vestiges remained or resulted in the 
unusual recognition of as many as 11 languages as official in post-apartheid 
South Africa, That is, Sepedi, Sesotho, Setswana, siSwati, Tshivenda, Xitsonga, 
Afrikaans, English, isiNdebele, isiXhosa, and isiZulu (Constitution 1996: Art. 
6.1). Nine are indigenous, but in reality English is the dominant Einzelsprache 
of post-apartheid South Africa’s public life and education, even to the extent of 
marginalizing the semi-indigenous/semi-colonial Einzelsprache of Afrikaans. 
The same is true of Namibia, where the Constitution designates English 
additionally as the country’s sole official language (Namibian 1998: Art. 3.1).
13  Obviously, the term ‘concerned ethnic groups’ is a shorthand for ‘concerned national activists’ who 
claimed to speak on behalf of their prospective nations (ethnic groups). (I thank Jernej Kosi for this 
important qualification.)
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The central European model of ethnolinguistic nation-state was also 
demonstrated in interwar Ethiopia. The country’s modernizing elite borrowed 
this model from the German Empire by the way of Japan. The indigenous 
Semitic Einzelsprache of Amharic, written in the indigenous Ethiopic (Ge’ez) 
script, functioned as Ethiopia’s sole national and official language until the 
1974 Revolution that overthrew the imperial system. Due to the liberation of 
the country from Italian occupation with the help of British forces, after World 
War II, English had become the leading language of education and public 
life in Ethiopia. In addition, after the revolution, at least 14 more indigenous 
languages were made into western-style Einzelsprachen. However, their use 
was typically limited to early elementary education. English and Amharic 
remained socialist (communist, Soviet) Ethiopia’s leading official languages, 
even though the former Einzelsprache was never designated as such by any piece 
of legislation. Yet, university-level education in Ethiopia has been invariably 
available only in English till now. After the fall of communism in Ethiopia 
(1991), ethnoterritorial federalism was introduced in this highly multiethnic 
country. By now at least 40 of Ethiopia’s over 80 ethnic groups have been 
granted with autonomous territories, where their indigenous Einzelsprachen 
are employed as media of education, and sometimes as languages of local 
administration. Similarly to today’s India – where numerous indigenous 
Einzelsprachen are in use in education and administration in the country’s 
states, but only English and Hindi are used at the federal level – Amharic and 
English remain Ethiopia’s sole languages of federal administration. This model 
of ethnoterrtitorial federation, as practiced in postcommunist Ethiopia, dates 
back to the Soviet Union, communist Yugoslavia, and ultimately originated in 
central Europe’s semi-imperial Austria-Hungary (Asnake Kefale, Kamusella 
and Van der Beken 2021)
In the Horn of Africa, a similar system for accommodating indigenous 
Einzelsprachen is practiced in Eritrea, which was a part of Ethiopia until 
1993. However, the country is not a federation and no language is formally 
designated as national or official. Instead, the Constitution guarantees 
equality of all Eritrean languages (Eritrea’s Constitution 1997: Art. 4.3). 
But de facto the non-indigenous idioms of English and Arabic function 
as the country’s official languages and media of education, while the main 
indigenous Einzelsprache of Tigrinya is used for official purposes only 
occasionally. Actually, it was ethnolinguistically homogenous postcolonial 
Somalia which, in 1979, took and enforced the unusual – outside Eurasia – 
decision to employ the indigenous Einzelsprache of Somali as the country’s 
sole official language and medium of education. The Constitution guaranteed 
the same official status for Arabic, but in actual practice the employment of 
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Arabic was limited to religious education in madrasas (Constitution 1979: 
Art. 3.2). However, in 1991 the nation-state broke up, and nowadays, due 
to prolonged civil warfare and wide international involvement, English has 
begun to function as the leading lingua franca in the post-Somalia de facto 
states (cf Constitution 2005: Art. 6.2).
Confusingly, some propose that Swahili is a good example of an indigenous 
African language, which is in both the de jure and de facto use in Tanzania to 
the exclusion of the post/colonial European Einzelsprache of English. Indeed, 
the employment of Swahili as the leading east African lingua franca is wide, 
extending from Kenya in the north to Zambia in the south, from the eastern 
parts of the Democratic Republic of Congo in the west to the Comoros in the 
Indian Ocean in the east. During the colonial times Swahili was thoroughly 
“Europeanized” as a western-style Einzelsprache, including the replacement 
of its originally Arabic script with the Latin alphabet (Fabian 1986: 13, 25-
26, 136-162). In Tanzania Swahili is an official language, along with English 
(Constitution 1977: Art. 67), but only the latter functions as the sole medium 
of instruction at the country’s universities.
In postcolonial Africa nationalism has been invariably assessed positively, but 
it is understood exclusively as an ethnically-blind ideology of building and 
reinforcing statehood within the boundaries inherited from the colonial times. 
Moreover, ethnolinguistic nationalism, typical for Eurasia, is disparaged in 
Africa as “backward tribalism.” In this highly politicized view, the term “tribe” 
is a normatively potent pejorative for “ethnic group.” The situation appears to 
be a typical example of double standards exposed in the use and application 
of international law and norms. The principle of national self-determination 
defined and executed in ethnolinguistic terms has been valued and followed 
in post-World War I central Europe, or in the wake of the postcommunist 
breakups of Czechoslovakia, the Soviet Union, and Yugoslavia. Yet, it is 
heralded as a hallmark of some vague “backwardness” in Africa (cf Okogu 
2016; Sharma 1973). Does anyone accuse Czech or Estonian nationalists of 
“tribalism”? On the contrary, they are portrayed as “patriots of their nation, 
language, and culture.”14
Outside Eurasia, it is assumed that sticking with the former colonial frontiers 
and a post/colonial European Einzelsprachen would ensure peace, stability, 
and prosperity. But does it? The telling example is that of Cameroon in central 
14  Yet, in the context of central Europe’s nation-states, similar pejoratives are used for criticizing 
“dialect-speakers” who are reluctant to master the official or national language of the state in which 
they happen to reside. Such a critique often leads to repression against activists, who want such 
“dialects” to be recognized as languages. (I thank Jernej Kosi for drawing my attention to this aspect.)
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Africa. After the Great War, this German colony was split between France and 
Britain. In 1960-1961, both colonies gained independence and formed a single 
nation-state of Cameroon. The subsequent preference for French and French-
speakers over English and English-speakers in Cameroon’s administration, 
education, and business, breached the constitutional guarantee of equal 
bilingualism and marginalized the latter group. The conflict turned violent in 
2018-2019, resulting in the death of half a thousand and displacement of half 
a million. Obviously, till elementary education which was ensured to all in 
the late 20th century, no Cameroonians spoke French or English as their first 
languages. Even today the vast majority of 23 million Cameroonians speak 
the country’s 200 or so indigenous Einzelsprachen as their “mother tongues.” 
But when it comes to politics, education, and state-wide (national) identity, 
for better or worse, Cameroonians now flank either with French or English. 
Ironically, they struggle and suffer for a European language though this 
linguistic difference is not of their own making (Cameroon’s Deadly 2019; 
Freeman 2018; Munshi 2019; O’Grady 2019).
A territory in the Americas that however slightly approaches the official use of 
an indigenous language in administration is Nunavut.15 The typical reaction 
to this proposition is “Where is that?” Nunavut is the most northerly of 
Canada’s provinces and territories. Its sparse and tiny population of 40,000 
enjoys the country’s two official European Einzelsprachen of English and 
French, to which, the indigenous language of Inuit (Inuktitut) was cautiously 
added during the 1990s (Consolidation 2008; Nunavut 1993: Art. 23.1.n). In 
2009, next door to Nunavut, in Denmark’s autonomous state of Greenland, 
inhabited by 56,000 people, without much fanfare, Inuit (Kalaallisut) was 
made the sole official language (Lov 2009: Art. 21). Yet, practically Danish 
and English dominate the country’s public life and education. Furthermore, 
due to the polity’s anomalous status, it is difficult to say whether Greenland 
should be treated as part of Europe or North America. Geographically 
speaking, it is a North American country, but from the political perspective, 
15  I exclude from the analysis, the system of ghetto-like “reserves, reservations, or indigenous territories,” 
where the remnants of nearly exterminated and ethnically cleansed indigenous ethnic groups (“first 
nations”) were forced, be it in North America or Brazil (cf List of Indian Reservations 2020; List of 
Indian Reserves 2020; List of Indigenous 2020). Not always, but in most cases these “native ghettoes” 
are employed for keeping these remnants of the surviving American ethnic groups out of sight, 
or for the sake of the brutally executed forced assimilation. Unsurprisingly, the use of indigenous 
languages is stigmatized and discouraged in these ghettoes in preference of the post/colonial European 
Einzelsprachen (cf Churchill 2005; Gierak-Onoszko 2019; Jarkowiec 2018). A similar system of 
“Aboriginal reserves” existed in Australia until the turn of the 1970s. Later, indigenous (“Aboriginal”) 
ethnic groups were given the right to reclaim their ancestral lands stolen by European colonizers 
(Land Won 2020). But this success was not repeated in the case of the indigenous languages, whose 
decline appears to be unstoppable now. At present only 42,000 persons (or 1.5 percent of Australia’s 
population) are fluent in 46 indigenous languages (Australian 2020).
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Greenland as part of Denmark is more tightly attached to Europe. Similar 
to Oceania’s small island nation-states discussed above, both Greenland and 
Nunavut may be seen as a “transitory borderland” between Eurasia and the 
Rest of the world in terms of the preferred pattern of official language use.
Out of Synch in Eurasia: Rejecting Indigenous Languages
In Eurasia, the standardization (construction) and choice of an indigenous 
Einzelsprachen for the role of national (official, state) language in a nation-
state always excludes other indigenous Einzelsprachen (typically disparaged as 
“dialects”) spoken (and often written) across the nation-state’s territory. Yet, 
as emphasized above, never a non-Eurasian Einzelsprache has been selected as 
an official language for a Eurasian polity. Perhaps, with the lonely exception 
of the aforementioned special case of autonomous Greenland, should this 
country be treated as part of Eurasia on the strength of its political association 
with Denmark.
In rare cases, a Eurasian Einzelsprache is chosen as official for a polity due 
to the vagaries of history or for political reasons, though it is not indigenous 
to the country’s territory or population. For instance, in Europe, this is the 
case of Belarus and Ireland. In the latter nation-state, the Celtic language of 
Irish is the national and official language (Constitution 1937: Art. 8.1), but in 
reality it is English that plays this role, though this Germanic Einzelsprache is 
constitutionally designated only as “a second official language” (Constitution 
1937: Art. 8.2). Both Belarusian and Russian are closely related Slavic 
Einzelsprachen. Most Belarusians see the former as their national and 
indigenous language, but the Constitution recognizes both as the country’s 
equal and official languages (Constitution 1994: Art. 19). In reality the state 
administration prefers Russian; more than 90 percent of the population 
speaks Russian in everyday life, and no university uses Belarusian as a leading 
medium of education (Barushka 2015).
Glancing at the map of Eurasia, one can easily observe that the correlation 
between indigenous languages, their speech communities, and states is the 
highest in Europe, and especially in central and eastern Europe. In this area 
of the continent, nation-states with the population of about 1 million people 
(Cyprus or Latvia), 2 million (North Macedonia or Slovenia), or 5 million 
(Finland or Slovakia) are not unusual. Typically, the smaller a population is 
the more homogenous it tends to be in a polity’s official (main) indigenous 
language. This correspondence was rather poor in the postwar Soviet Union 
(SU), yet its constituent republics operated also in their indigenous (“titular”) 
languages, apart from the communist polity’s sole “federal” Einzelsprache of 
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Russian. The breakup of the SU in 1991 made these 15 constituent republics 
into independent ethnolinguistic nation-states in their own right. In most 
cases, Russian was sidelined or replaced by the republican titular Einzelsprache 
in the role of state and national language.
However, the Russian Federation remains highly multiethnic, with non-
Russian ethnic groups accounting for at least a fifth of the country’s 
inhabitants. Nowadays, there are 22 autonomous republics based on these 
ethnic groups with more than 20 different (or over 30, if all Dagestan’s 
languages are taken into consideration) Einzelsprachen in the function 
of official languages and that of media of education. But, all the country’s 
secondary schools and universities employ exclusively Russian as their 
language of instruction. The parliaments of all the autonomous republics 
provide information on their websites in Russian and only in ten republican 
languages (Bashkir, Buriat, Crimean Tatar, Chuvash, Circassian, Komi, 
Tatar, Udmurt, Ukrainian, and Yakut). More than 50 book titles per annum 
are published just in four non-Russian languages (that is, Bashkir, Chuvash, 
Tatar, and Yakut) (Gosudarstvennye 2020; Iazykovaia 2020). Hence, Russia 
appears to be on the course of doing away with the official and public use of 
any other indigenous languages than Russian. In equally multiethnic China at 
least 112 million people belong to ethnically non-Chinese (non-Han) ethnic 
groups. It is a staggering number equal to that of all ethnic Russians living 
in today’s Russia. However, these speakers of non-Chinese languages account 
for less than a tenth of China’s inhabitants (Demographics 2020). At present, 
it appears that Beijing is intent on assimilating all these non-Chinese-speakers 
as quickly as possible, officially for the sake of ending poverty, but in reality 
the intention is to create an ethnolinguistically homogenous nation-state of 
China (Anand 2019; Davidson 2020).
As mentioned above, the indifference to and negligence of other indigenous 
languages than the designated national Einzelsprache in southeast Asia’s 
nation-states is dictated by the logic of ethnolinguistic nationalism. A similar 
outcome can be observed in highly multiethnic Iran and Pakistan. But in 
these countries the decision on making a single language official (national) 
and the exclusion of others is underwritten by confessional nationalism, 
followed in the interest of building an Islamic republic. In turn, present-day 
Afghanistan, like India, allows for the use of multiple indigenous languages 
(Constitution 1382 [2004CE]: Art. 16). But due to prolonged and extensive 
foreign and international involvement in this country since the turn of the 
1970s, nowadays English is Afghanistan’s main lingua franca, making the 
country’s language politics even more similar to India’s.
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Politics of Script: Latin Alphabet = Cultural Imperialism
The cleavage between Eurasia and the Rest of the world in language politics 
is even clearer when this split is observed from the perspective of script. 
The technology of writing was invented independently, perhaps, only four 
times in history, namely, in Mesopotamia, China, Mesoamerica, and the 
Andes (Clayton 2019). Hence, the invention was twice in Eurasia and twice 
outside it. But European conquistadors and colonizers extinguished these two 
indigenous traditions of writing in the Americas. As a result, only the Eurasian 
technologies of writing survive till now. The Chinese tradition is limited now 
to east Asia, namely, China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. Elsewhere in Eurasia 
and across the Rest of the world, different kinds of Mesopotamia-style writing 
are now in use.
A multitude of unique scripts are employed across south and southeast Asia. 
Present-day India is the world’s most polyscriptal16 polity with 22 indigenous 
languages that are currently official in the country’s 28 states. Half of these 
Einzelsprachen are written in their specific scripts; whereas Bodo, Dogri, 
Konkani, Maithili, Marathi, Nepali, and Sanskrit share the Devanagari 
writing system of India’s (constitutionally designated) national language of 
Hindi. Similarly, the Arabic script is shared by the three state-level official 
languages, namely, Kashmiri, Sindhi, and Urdu (92nd Constitutional 2004).17 
Significantly, Urdu, one of these Arabic script-based Einzelsprachen is also 
Pakistan’s sole national and official language.
In southeast Asia, typically, a script is in exclusive use for writing and printing 
a given ethnolinguistically defined nation-state’s single national language. 
For instance, in Thailand the national Einzelsprache of Thai is written in 
the unique and eponymous Thai script, which is not employed for any other 
languages. Hence, the Thai writing system is a proper national script. Outwith 
southeast Asia, unique national scripts are employed for writing the national 
languages of Armenian in Armenia, Georgian in Georgia, and Hebrew in 
Israel. The Greek alphabet is used exclusively for writing the Greek language, 
but this Einzelsprache is the official and national language in two nation-
states, namely, Cyprus and Greece.
16  How to form an adjective from the noun “script”? When a decade ago, I began writing about the 
politics of script (writing), some proposed the adjectival form should read “scriptural.” Unfortunately, 
an immediate association with some “holy scriptures” sprang up. But should the word be pruned of the 
second letter [r], yielding “scriptual,” this form was mostly liberated from this unwanted association. 
Yet, in this text I use now “scriptal,” following the example of Bunčić, Lippert and Rabus (2016), who 
authored an authoritative monograph on the subject of biscriptality.
17  Apart from the approved official scripts for India’s official languages, these languages’ speakers tend 
to use a variety of unofficial scripts, due to their religion or influence from other languages written in 
different scripts.
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Elsewhere in the world, the Arabic, Latin, and Cyrillic writing systems 
dominate. Apart from the Arabic language, the Arabic script is employed 
for a variety of other languages in the ideologically Islamic nation-states 
from Pakistan and Iran in southwestern Asia to the Arabic Peninsula and 
north Africa in the west. Cyrillic is employed with the national languages 
of the ideologically Orthodox Slavophone nation-states in the Balkans, that 
is, in Bulgaria, Montenegro, North Macedonia, and Serbia. Otherwise, 
the employment of this alphabet used to be quite tightly correlated with 
the territory of the Soviet Union and its Asian satellite of Mongolia. After 
the breakup of this communist polity, the post-Soviet states of Azerbaijan, 
Moldova, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan decided to write their eponymous 
national languages in Latin letters. At present, Kazakhstan is in the process 
of superseding Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet for writing the national and 
official language of Kazakh.
In Eurasia, the Latin alphabet dominates across most of Europe, in Turkey, in 
the post-Soviet Turkic nation-states (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan 
and Uzbekistan) and in the eastern half of southeast Asia (Brunei, East Timor, 
Indonesia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, and Vietnam). 
The Latin script is indigenous to Europe. It was the post-Ottoman Turkey’s 
sovereign decision to switch from Arabic to Latin letters for writing Turkish 
in 1928. The interwar period was most probably the high age of western 
(European) imperialism. Unsurprisingly, in the eyes of Turkey’s secular 
republican elite, the Latin alphabet appeared to be the script of modernity and 
progress (read: power). After the collapse of the SU, the post-Soviet Turkic 
nation-states decided to replace Cyrillic with the Latin alphabet in emulation 
of republican Turkey, and as a postcolonial (anti-colonial) reaction to the 
former Russian/Soviet political and cultural domination. Yet, the presence 
of the Latin alphabet in southeast Asia is a clear legacy of Europe’s maritime 
colonial empires, like across the Rest of the world.
Outside Eurasia, the non-indigenous Latin alphabet dominates almost 
absolutely, with the exception of the Ethiopic (Ge’ez) script which is used 
for writing Ethiopia’s federal Einzelsprache of Amharic along with some 
other indigenous languages in this country. Western (European) colonial 
domination either introduced the Latin alphabet or replaced indigenous 
writing systems with it. Since the colonizing pressure was so strong until the 
mid-20th century, the Latin alphabet was often equated and confused with 
“modernization and progress” in non-European countries. For example, in 
east Asia serious projects were considered for replacing the Chinese script 
with Latin letters for writing and publishing in Chinese, Japanese, Korean, 
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and Vietnamese (cf DeFrancis 1984: 235). The legacy of this trend is the 
Vietnamese Latin alphabet (Chữ Quốc ngữ) (Gunn 2003: 242), alongside 
the ubiquitous Romanizations of Chinese, Japanese, and Korean names and 
inscriptions on road signs and in public notices across China, Japan, and both 
Koreas. These Romanization systems – referred to as Pinyin, Romaji, and 
Romaja, respectively – function as unofficial “Latin alphabets” of Chinese, 
Japanese, and Korean.
The exclusive use of the non-indigenous Latin alphabet for writing and 
publishing in the Rest of the world clearly marks the cleavage between it and 
Eurasia. Not only are non-indigenous European Einzelsprachen cast in the 
role of official and national languages across the Rest of the world, but also 
all of them are written in non-indigenous Latin letters. From the perspective 
of the politics of language and script, the Rest of the world can be considered 
an extension of Europe, a monoscriptal neo-Europe. The same is also true for 
much of central and southeast Asia where the Latin script is employed. What 
is more, to a large degree Russian colonialism (imperialism) has been also 
European (western) in its character, at least, since the turn of the 18th century, 
when Muscovy (Russia) embarked on modernizing (that is, westernizing, 
Europeanizing) reforms. Hence, the use of Cyrillic across northern Asia 
and parts of central Asia (alongside Russian as the preferred lingua franca) 
is indicative of European (western) colonial domination, though Russian-
inflected. That is how extensive and pervasive European (western) cultural 
and linguistic imperialism is nowadays. This imperialism’s most obvious and 
readily visible “logos” are the Latin and Cyrillic alphabets.
However, people who write and read in scripts other than the Latin alphabet, 
usually have a working knowledge of Latin letters. They use the Latin writing 
system for Romanization, to write down names of western personalities (in 
order to avoid confusion involved, when these are transliterated into another 
script), at times on car license plates, and obviously when they acquire a 
western (European) Einzelsprache. Contrarily, the users of Latin letters almost 
never reciprocate this gesture by acquiring even a rudimentary command 
of a non-Latin script. Nowadays the Latin alphabet is more “global” (that 
is, dominant) in its character than the “world language” of English. But 
somehow, this form of imperialism, scriptal imperialism, evades any explicit 
scrutiny.
Conclusion: Cyberspace, or the Latest Frontier
During the 1990s, after the fall of communism and the end of the Cold War, 
the worldwide “inter-network” was launched for the advantage of population 
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at large. The internet arrived with the democratic promise that it would be 
readily available for “free” and provide “unbiased” information to everyone. 
But initially, the web was available in English and Latin letters only. Even 
today, 60 percent of the content available across the internet is in English 
only. The distant second language is Russian, in which 8.6 percent of the 
web’s content is written. The overwhelming bulk of the internet content 
comes in European Einzelsprachen. The little remaining chunk is available in 
Asian languages – mainly in Turkish, Persian, Japanese, Chinese, Vietnamese, 
Arabic, Indonesian, Thai, Hebrew and Hindi – that collectively account for 
almost 14 percent of the content. Whatever content is provided through the 
medium of non-Eurasian languages, it is so little in comparison to the overall 
bulk of the internet that such content does not really show up in any general 
statistics (Usage 2020).
Wikipedia, now available in over 300 Einzelsprachen, is also a useful yardstick 
for assessing the disparity in internet-cum-linguistic divide between Eurasia 
and the Rest of the world. All the Wikipedias in May 2020 contained 
53,535,000 articles, but a mere 232,000 (0.4%) articles were offered in non-
Eurasian languages. Readers could enjoy 159,000 articles in the Wikipedias 
written in African Einzelsprachen (excluding Afrikaans and Arabic), 56,000 
articles in American languages, and 17,000 articles in Oceania’s indigenous 
Einzelsprachen. At the same time, the Afrikaans Wikipedia boasted 91,000 
articles and the Arabic Wikipedia – 1,046,000 articles, so together seven times 
more than in all the Wikipedias written in Africa’s indigenous Einzelsprachen. 
At least 33,974,000 (63.5%) Wikipedia articles could be accessed in European 
languages, which indicates well the staggering level of western (European) 
cultural and linguistic imperialism in today’s world (List of Wikipedias 2020).
Decolonization of culture and language politics is not on the cards anytime 
soon. Some equality in this context has been achieved only in Eurasia, 
and especially in Europe, mainly central Europe with its plethora of 
ethnolinguistically defined nation-states. In any foreseeable future, sadly, 
members of indigenous ethnic groups and speakers of indigenous languages 
in the Rest of the world are bound to suffer the continuing indignity of 
the imposition of post/colonial European languages on their communities, 
cultures, and polities.
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